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Abstract. Hospital acquired infections are infections that occur in pa-
tients during hospitalization, which were not present at the time of ad-
mission. They are among the most common adverse events in healthcare
around the world, leading to increased mortality and morbidity rates,
prolonged hospitalization periods and considerable financial burden on
both hospitals and patients. Preventive guidelines and regulations have
been devised, however compliance to these is frequently poor and there is
much room for improvement. This paper presents the prototype of an ex-
tensible, configurable cyber-physical system, developed under European
Union funding, that will assist in the prevention of hospital infections
and outbreaks. Integrating a wireless sensor network for the surveillance
of clinical processes with configurable monitoring software built around
a workflow engine as key component, our solution detects deviations
from established hygiene practices and provides real-time information
and alerts whenever an infection risk is discovered. The platform is de-
scribed from both hardware and software perspective, with emphasis on
the wireless network’s elements as well as the most important software
components. Furthermore, two clinical workflows of different complexity,
which are included in the system prototype are detailed. The finalized
system is expected to facilitate the creation and automated monitor-
ing of clinical workflows that are associated with over 90% of hospital
infections.
Introduction
Hospital acquired infections (HAI), also known as healthcare associated infec-
tions or nosocomial infections are among the most common adverse events in
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healthcare around the world, affecting between 8% and 12% of patients admit-
ted to hospitals in the European Union [22,13], and 5% to 10% of hospitalized
patients in the United States every year [10]. Hospital infections refer to those
infections that occur in patients during hospitalization, which were not present
or incubating at the time of admission, including ”infections acquired in the hos-
pital but appearing after discharge, and also occupational infections among staff
of the facility” [57].
HAI are prevalent across the globe, regardless of geographical, social or eco-
nomic factors [51,12,59,21,60]. In addition to their most critical consequences,
which are an increased rate of mortality and morbidity (an annual number of
37 000 deaths in Europe, 99 000 attributable deaths in the USA [60], 8 000
in Canada [9] and between 7% and 46% attributed mortality rates in South-
east Asia [34]), HAI also translate in prolonged hospitalization periods (5 to
29.5 days worldwide [61]) and further administered treatments. This leads to
a considerable financial burden, estimated between $28 and 45 billion in the
United States [48], $129 million in extra costs incurred in Canada [27] [9], and
e7 billion in Europe, in 2008 [20]. Furthermore, the problem of HAI is closely
connected with antimicrobial resistance, another fundamental difficulty for mod-
ern healthcare and a significant threat to public health. Many bacterial species,
such as Pseudomonas, Acinetobacter, Staphylococcus aureus or Clostridium dif-
ficile have developed to be resistant to a wide range of antibiotics. In many cases,
they also represent major causes of HAI [32].
Having been recognized as a significant issue for 30 years now [51], surveil-
lance has been in place and measures and precautions have been taken [11,62]
especially during the past decade, in order to reduce nosocomial infection rates.
When specific steps are taken by medical personnel, infection rates have been
shown to decrease by more than 70% [11]. Preventive efforts have proven to be
successful, as a report from the Agency of Healthcare Research and Quality [1]
estimates a 17% decline in the rate of HAI from 2010 to 2013 in the United
States. However, the issue is still a delicate one and there is much room for
improvement.
This paper presents an extensible, configurable cyber-physical system that
will assist in the prevention of HAI and outbreaks [7]. Integrating a wireless sen-
sor network (WSN) for the surveillance of clinical workflows with configurable
monitoring software, our solution detects deviations from established hygiene
practices and provides real-time information and alerts, whenever nonconfor-
mity is discovered. The hardware network of wireless sensors that can be de-
ployed within variable-sized clinical locations collect real-time information from
the clinical setting, such as substance or material availability (soap, antimicro-
bial agents, sterile gloves) and environmental conditions affecting the spread of
pathogens (oxygen levels, airflow, temperature), thereby providing a complete
image of the hospital environment in real time. Monitoring of complex processes
such as management of indwelling urinary catheters, postoperative care, intu-
bation or endoscopy is possible by describing them using software workflows
that are interpreted and executed by a workflow engine. When the sequence
of transitions inferred by the system from sensor data presents deviations from
the expected flow, the system alerts responsible personnel. The system will also
provide advanced analytics, which are extremely important for pinpointing dif-
ficult infection sources that elude existing workflows and for the identification of
existing activities targeted towards outbreak prevention and control.
The system is researched and built within a European Union-funded project
and its current stage of development represents a proof of concept, including
multifunctional smart sensors for monitoring the use of soap, antimicrobial gel
and water sink together with two clinical workflows that describe the required
hygiene procedures in the case of the general practitioner’s office and for minor
surgeries that are performed within the clinic where the system will be first
deployed. This paper details the smart devices employed, the hardware-software
integration as well as the software components that ensure the cyber-physical
system achieves its objective of lowering the number and severity of hospital
infections.
1 State of the Art
In recent years several concrete measures have been taken to reduce the risk
of infections in hospitals. As such, guidelines and rules of prevention have been
devised for healthcare personnel and patients’ safety [33]. As a response of the
necessities within the hospital environment, various software or hybrid hardware
and software systems have been developed to ensure strict compliance with and
enforcement of these instructions.
1.1 Monitoring Hand Hygiene
Proper hand hygiene is considered the single most valuable tool in preventing
the spread of healthcare-associated infections [33]. Despite existing information,
hand hygiene measures are still not widely adopted, being applied in only 40%
of cases when it is required [43]. Thus, the underlying idea used by quite a
large number of systems is continuous monitoring of healthcare workers’ hand
hygiene and real-time alert generation in case of non-compliance with established
guidelines.
Numerous existing Information and Communication Technology (ICT) solu-
tions use this idea of continuous surveillance and immediate notification in case
of hygiene rule violation. IntelligentM [41] and Hyginex [30] are two systems
that combine sensors attached to soap, disinfectant dispensers or faucets with
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) enabled bracelets designed to be worn
by medical personnel. Whenever hygiene events are omitted, the systems detect
the violation and the bracelet alerts the clinician using vibrations or luminous
signals. Biovigil Technology [4] and MedSense [26] are similar systems which use
wearable badges attached to healthcare workers’ uniforms. While Biovigil uses
chemical sensors placed at hospital ward entrances to detect whether hand hy-
giene is undertaken, MedSense employs beacons placed above patient beds or in
other points of care, with the aim to establish a wireless patient zone. This allows
the badge to identify hand hygiene opportunities by detecting when the badge
enters or exits a patient zone. SwipeSense [50] is composed of a series of small,
recyclable alcohol-based gel dispensers, which can be worn by medical personnel
together with proximity sensors mounted on hospital walls and a monitoring
web platform. Due to this design, the system allows clinicians to perform hand
hygiene without interrupting their activities to walk to a sink or a disinfectant
dispenser [45]. UltraClenz’s Patient Safeguard System [53] is somewhat similar
to MedSense, in that it employs a patient based approach, as opposed to the
room based approach of previously presented technologies. The system prompts
workers to sanitize before and after every patient contact. Unlike other systems
presented so far, DebMed [16] does not use RFID technology, nor any devices for
medical personnel. It integrates a wireless network of dispensers that send data
to a server via hubs and modems installed on each floor. The server applica-
tion uses a customizable algorithm [18] to estimate the number of hand hygiene
opportunities per patient-day and compares this number with the actual hand
hygiene events that were performed.
1.2 Disinfection Robots
The systems mentioned in the previous section prevent the spread of HAI by
ensuring that transmission is not induced by medical personnel via contami-
nated hands. But transmission can also occur via air or contaminated surfaces.
Preventing this using chemicals or ultraviolet light has proven successful.
Short-wavelength ultraviolet (UV-C) light provides a strong germicidal ef-
fect, by inducing cellular damage and cell death in pathogens. Water, air and
surfaces can be purified using UV-C. However, humans must avoid direct UV-C
irradiation due to its harmful effects.
Several types of solutions using UV-C or chemical substances have been de-
veloped for air and surface disinfection, in the form of disinfection robots. Tru-D
Smart UVC [52] scans the room to be disinfected and computes the optimal UV-
C light dose required for disinfection according to the particularities of the room.
These include its size, geometry, surface reflectivity and the amount and loca-
tion of equipment present. The robot performs disinfection of the entire room,
from top to bottom in one cycle and from one location, ensuring that the ul-
traviolet light reaches even shadowed areas. The Xenex ”Germ-Zapping Robot”
[63] called ”Little Moe” can disinfect a room using pulses of high-intensity, high-
energy ultraviolet light. The deactivation of pathogens takes place in less than
five minutes and the disinfected room remains at a low microbial load until it
is re-contaminated by a person or the ventilation system. The UV-Disinfection
Robot developed by Blue Ocean Robotics [5] has the same purpose as Little
Moe and Tru-D. The robot can drive autonomously when called upon by medi-
cal personnel and the approximate time it needs for fully disinfecting a room is
between 10 to 15 minutes.
In addition to UV-C light, certain chemical substances or chemical reactions
can be used to eliminate harmful bacteria. The Bioquell Q-10 robot [3] emits
hydrogen peroxide vapours, which are safe for hospital and equipment surfaces,
as well as for other technological machinery and computers, but are deadly to
pathogens. This antibacterial bleaching agent is also toxic to humans and there-
fore another solution must be distributed across the room after disinfection,
to make it safe for humans to enter. A different approach is taken by Sterisafe
Decontamination technology [47]: the Sterisafe robot does not employ any chem-
icals, but disinfects rooms, including corners and shadowed areas, and removes
gases and harmful particles using activated oxygen, also known as ozone. Com-
pared to UV-C light robots, Sterisafe’s main advantages are that it disinfects
hard to reach surfaces (under beds, behind equipment), while as opposed to the
Bioquell Q-10 robots, it completely removes the ozone and other by-products at
the end of the disinfection cycle, leaving the room safe for people. A comparison
study effectuated by Andersen et al. [2] concluded that disinfection with UV-C
light is very effective, but it’s best used in conjunction with chemical disinfection,
to ensure good cleaning of shadowed areas.
1.3 Infections and Outbreak Management
The fight against infections is reinforced through other types of systems that
were designed for infection management, such as clinical decision support sys-
tems or identification of models that shape the spread of disease. Protocol Watch
[39] is a decision support system used to improve compliance with the ”Surviving
Sepsis Campaign” international guidelines [49], simplifying the implementation
of sepsis prevention protocols by regularly checking certain medical parameters
of patients. Other relevant software systems developed to enhance treatment
policy in case of an infection outbreak are RL6:Infection [40] and Accreditrack
[23]. Through proactive monitoring and integration of data obtained from several
hospital systems, RL6:Infection helps responsible persons to optimize their ini-
tiatives and to make the right decisions concerning infection prevention, based
on data collected and presented by the system. Accreditrack was designed to
ensure compliance with hand hygiene guidelines, to verify nosocomial infection
management processes as well as to provide visibility and transparency for these
processes.
Another beneficial endeavour for modelling the spread of disease, for iden-
tification of control policies and for ensuring the adoption of correct medical
practices is building contact networks [15]. A number of studies have modelled
interactions in clinical settings using data collected by wireless sensor networks
and electronic medical records, and illustrated that contact network knowledge
can be used in preventing and handling hospital infections [25,29,31,46,54,55].
The systems presented in this section are effective, but they all address the is-
sue of hospital infections from a singular direction. Systems for monitoring hand
hygiene specifically target processes involving disinfection of hands, disinfection
robots are useful for disinfecting rooms and equipment, while systems for manag-
ing outbreaks are particularly targeted towards that definite goal. The problem
of hospital infections and outbreaks however, is a complex one, and we believe
a more comprehensive approach will provide a better solution. The platform
we propose intends to tackle HAI from several directions, using a two-pronged
approach. First, a basic line of defence able to monitor clinical workflows most
prone to infection transmission in real time will handle both pathogen-agnostic
and pathogen-specific scenarios. Second, an advanced line of defence will be cre-
ated, that will employ risk maps and will build contact networks using the data
gathered as part of the basic line of defence. To the best of our knowledge, our
proposed system is the first of its kind to combine a sensor network and software
in a cyber-physical platform of the intended versatility. The following sections
of the paper describe our proposed system in more detail.
2 HAI-OPS - Platform Overview
The platform we propose is developed within the Hospital Acquired Infection
and Outbreak Prevention System (HAI-OPS) research project [28], which aims to
build a pragmatic, automated solution to significantly decrease overall mortality
and morbidity associated with HAI by specifically targeting their most common
sources and pathways of transmission. To achieve this, the system will leverage
advances in computing power and availability of custom-developed, affordable
hardware that will be combined with a configurable, workflow-based software
system [8].
HAI-OPS will address several clinical and maintenance processes and pro-
cedures, such as hand hygiene, catheter management, invasive procedures and
surgical care. The system will employ an approach that allows the definition
and execution of custom Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [37] en-
coded workflows, which model various clinical and maintenance processes. The
cyber-physical platform will be configurable so that it covers differences between
clinical unit location and layout, differences in types and specifics of undertaken
procedures, as well as variation between existing hygiene guidelines. Further-
more, it will offer interoperability with hospital information systems (HIS) and
will allow patient and infection data analysis using risk maps and contact net-
works. As such, the system will also be geared to help hospital epidemiologists
in the fight against infection and outbreaks.
The cornerstone of the proposed system is the detection of events happening
within the monitored location which are deemed relevant to infection prevention.
For the purposes of the pilot deployment, the system will detect the following
event types:
– Presence of persons within the clinical unit. The system will monitor em-
ployees working in clinical or auxiliary positions as well as patients. Person
monitoring will be achieved using passive RFID tags embedded in badges.
Employees will be provided with permanent customized badges linked to
their user profile. Patients will receive a temporary tag when checking into
the clinic reception, a mandatory step before any appointment. The use of
passive technology allows keeping tags light and inexpensive, while powered
elements are embedded in the environment.
– Person enters or leaves a room. The passive tags issued to personnel as well
as patients, as described above, will be detected by active RFID antennas
mounted within the door frames of monitored rooms. This will allow identi-
fication of the person as well as determine their direction of movement.
– Person undertakes hand hygiene. According to the regulations within the
partner clinic, hand hygiene can be undertaken using either soap and water,
or antimicrobial gel. Both are at the disposal of medical personnel and are
placed near the sink within all rooms where clinical activities require it. The
system will employ sensor-equipped soap and gel dispensers that transmit an
event whenever they are used. Furthermore, the system will employ active
RFID installed near the sink to also identify the person who is undertaking
hand hygiene. As such, hand hygiene is a high-level event that the software
identifies based on several low-level events: proximity to sink area and use
of soap dispenser or antimicrobial gel.
– Person equips gloves. Dispensers for single-use gloves are installed through-
out the clinic, near the sink in all rooms where their use might be required.
Dispensers will be equipped with sensors that emit an event whenever they
are used.
– Patient examination start. For most workflows, this is the first contact be-
tween patient and medical personnel. Patient examinations always take place
within a designated area of the room, which usually has a patient bed in-
stalled. The system will detect the patient examination event using several
low-level events, namely practitioner and patient proximity to the consulta-
tion bed as well as thermal imaging data based on an array-type sensor.
– Equipment is used. Certain procedures require the use of single-use or ster-
ilized equipment. Dispensers are monitored for the single use items. Equip-
ment that can be reused must be sterilized in the autoclave, and witness
strips must be employed to prove that the sterilization process was complete.
In this case, barcode strips will be printed and affixed to sterilized packages,
which will be scanned using a wall-mounted reader when first opened. This
will ensure the traceability of the sterilization process for equipment.
– Surface disinfection. This is undertaken using spray-type disinfectant in re-
cipients. Like in the case of other dispensers, sensors will detect and emit an
event when used.
3 Modelling Clinical Processes
The HAI-OPS platform will monitor various clinical processes defined and en-
coded as workflows. A workflow engine will create and execute instances of work-
flows and emit real-time alerts when infection risks are detected, based on the
expected succession of actions encoded. Any clinical process can be seen as a
sequence of events, conditions and activities and thus modelled using BPMN
notation. In this section we describe and model two workflows that are proposed
for implementation within the clinical partner of the project, the NZOZ Eskulap
[36] outpatient clinic in Skierniwice, Poland.
Fig. 1. General Practitioner Workflow (from [7])
3.1 General Practitioner
The consultation workflow taking place in the general practitioner (GP) office
is the first one considered, given the number of daily consultations and the high
degree of event overlap that exists with other workflows taking place within the
partner clinic. The simplified BPMN-like model of this workflow, as it takes place
within the partner clinic is illustrated in Figure 1.
An instance of this workflow is created every time a patient enters the GP’s
office. This is detected using an RFID active system mounted at the door frame,
as well as the RFID passive tag the patient receives at the clinic reception when
checking in for the appointment. All sensor types employed, along with their
positioning inside the GP’s office are detailed in Section 4.
After a short conversation, during which the GP might write down various
details about the patient’s medical issues, patient examination starts. This is de-
tected by a combination of sensors: the RFID tags of the doctor and the patient,
a proximity sensor mounted at the side of the bed and additionally an infrared
sensor mounted over the bed, used for checking presence. Given the flow mod-
elled in Figure 1, the system detects that patient examination starts, at which
point it checks that hand hygiene was undertaken by the general practitioner.
Existing regulations precisely detail how to undertake hand hygiene correctly.
Thus, hands must be sanitized according to 10 steps for effective hygiene [58].
Assuming that all medical personnel are aware of the detailed actions and
correct procedure for proper hand washing, the system will only check that the
sink, disinfectants and paper towel dispenser were operated. A collection of sen-
sors mounted on the tap, soap, disinfectant and paper towel dispensers detects
the sequence of actions performed. If the sequence is detected in accordance
with the provided workflow, the system acknowledges that compliance has been
achieved. Otherwise, an alert is generated, sent to the GP and persisted within
the system. In such a situation, if the workflow is violated, its instance is stopped
and the hygiene breach is recorded. After receiving notification, the GP will have
to perform hand hygiene before examining the patient, or else the system will
Fig. 2. Minor Surgery Workflow.
continue recording and sending alerts. If the workflow continues without inter-
ruption, its last step requires the GP to disinfect their hands using antimicrobial
gel after the last contact with the patient. This event is again recorded by the
system using the same sensors situated in the disinfectant dispenser area. When
the examination is finished, the GP updates the patient’s record and the patient
leaves the office. The workflow is thus completed. All actions detected during
workflow execution are persisted by the system to allow statistics and advanced
analyses.
The presented workflow accounts for an ordinary GP consultation. However,
some examinations, such as those involving the head, eyes, ears, nose and throat
or those concerning patients with skin infections require additional precautions
which should be included in the associated workflow. More precisely, new actions
must be added, referring to the doctor employing disposable gloves which must
be put on before examination and disposed of immediately after the procedure
is completed.
3.2 Minor Surgery
Minor surgeries represent the most complex clinical workflow currently under-
taken within the NZOZ Eskulap clinic [36]. Given the documented risk of in-
fection following surgical procedures, as well as the complexity of invasive pro-
cedures that involve both medical personnel and equipment, we believe these
workflows are suitable for assessing the impact and performance of the proposed
system. Furthermore, ascertaining that our system does not impose additional
overhead for existing processes is equally important to consider.
Minor surgeries are undertaken by a team that consists of a surgeon and a
nurse, who must follow a well established hygiene protocol. The equipment used
during the procedure is either single use or must be sterilized. A traceability
system must be employed to allow proving that equipment underwent proper
sterilization. The minor surgery suite consists of a consultation room, which is
the first room entered by the patient, and continues with the operating room
itself, which can be accessed only from the consultation room. In most cases,
minor surgery involves several patient appointments. These include the initial
consultation, the intervention itself and one or more follow-up appointments for
examination or dressing change.
Given the purpose of our system, we do not examine the medical procedures
that take place in detail, but focus our attention on those steps that experts deem
to present high infection risk. In the following we detail the types of surgical
appointments that take place at the Eskulap clinic:
– Patient examination. This is undertaken within the consultation room, in
the presence of the surgeon, and with the possible participation of the nurse.
Hygiene requirements are similar to those in the general practitioner’s office:
both the surgeon and nurse must undertake hand hygiene before and after
patient examination.
– Dressing change. This takes place in the operating room, in the presence of
at least one medical practitioner. The hygiene requirements are similar to
those during patient examination.
– Minor surgery. Interventions can take place with or without an immediately
preceding patient examination. Surgeries are undertaken only within the
operating room, and consist in a series of well defined steps:
1. Appointment starts when the patient enters the operating room
2. Patient lays down on the operating table.
3. The nurse undertakes hand hygiene and equips single use gloves.
4. The nurse prepares the equipment to be used. Sterilized equipment is
taken out of the cabinet, the autoclave sterilization strip is checked and
the pouch is opened on the instrument tray.
5. The surgeon undertakes hand hygiene and equips single use gloves.
6. After the procedure is complete, the patient leaves the surgery suite.
7. Nurse disinfects the surgery table.
8. The appointment is complete.
Given that procedures for patient examination and dressing change are sim-
ilar to those in the general practitioner’s office, Figure 2 illustrates only the
expected event flow taking place within the operating room. As shown in the
figure, there exists a degree of overlap between the described workflows. This is
both expected, as events such as person movement, hand hygiene and equipment
use and sterilization are the cornerstones of preventing infection transmission.
Furthermore, a high degree of overlap will allow for the reuse of custom devel-
oped devices and will lower the cost of deploying and maintaining the system.
3.3 Known Challenges
We identified some challenges regarding the interaction of the system with the
clinical processes mentioned in the previous subsections, which might emerge
particularly due to the various possible constraints. We present these challenges
below, including solutions that have already been identified, or potential solu-
tions that are still being investigated within the project.
Firstly, the natural course of clinical processes must not be disrupted by
the HAI-OPS platform. The system should not interfere with normal clinical
activities, should achieve minimal overhead on clinical processes, as well as high
usability and maximal automation so that manual intervention is required only
when a risk is detected. Clinical staff must not experience any other modifications
from their usual activities; hygiene activities must be performed identically with
alerts sent to practitioners through their smartphones.
The placement of sensors within offices, surgery theaters, or generally, in
any hospital room, is a challenge within itself. Different types of sensors will be
used to detect proximity, position and movement. This requires setting up an
appropriate topology for positioning them that will ensure the accurate detection
of monitored workflows. Furthermore, the system must take into consideration
various restrictions that exist in medical units, such as radio frequency shielding,
influence of electromagnetic radiation or Bluetooth interference with medical
devices [17,42,56]. To overcome all these, our system will use communication
protocols such as healthcare-targeted Bluetooth Low Energy profiles [38], or even
wired communication when necessary together with custom designed intelligent
devices.
Finally, the most complex challenge regards the possibility of other persons
entering the consultation or surgery rooms during examination or minor surgery.
If the new person touches one of the practitioners or the patient, they must
perform hand disinfection once again. While identification persons can be made
as soon as they enter the room, detecting contact between physician, patient
and another person is a very difficult task from a technological standpoint. Our
project aims to address this challenge by limiting detection to the area of the
consultation bed or surgery table using a proximity sensor array placed over
the area, as detailed within Section 4. A definitive solution to this challenge
is to trigger the execution of a new workflow once an external person enters
the examination/surgery room during consultation or minor surgery. We are
still investigating possible solutions which involve the clear detection of contact,
to avoid having to trigger a new workflow instance in cases when this is not
absolutely necessary.
4 The Wireless Sensor Network
The hardware platform consists of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) addressed
to measure and communicate to the software system information about the work-
flow related actions that are taking place inside the clinical location. All these
events are generated by various types of sensors which have different compu-
tational, communication and power requirements. For this reason, we designed
two different types of hardware nodes: dummy and smart nodes.
Dummy nodes are small, cheap and plain. They are only able to detect sim-
ple, low-level actions and send corresponding events to one of the smart nodes.
A dummy node usually integrates a proximity sensor and an accelerometer. The
proximity sensor features an interrupt function for range detection up to 200mm.
The node sends the triggered events to smart nodes using BLE communication,
which is further explained in Section 4.1. Both the sensors and the communi-
cation module stand for low current consumption, thus it is possible to power
supply the device for several years using a small, coin-type battery.
Dummy nodes are able to detect what action is taking place, but the smart
nodes are the ones that complete this information by adding who is triggering
it, where and when it took place. In the general practitioner’s office, the smart
node has to find out which person is involved in every action triggered by the
dummy nodes (e.g. washing hands, dispensing soap, and so on). To achieve that
goal, it communicates with an RFID reader and a thermal array sensor. The
location of the smart node inside the GP’s office is delimited by the passive
infrared array sensor. In this case, it is placed over the consultation bed. This
sensor is able to trigger the event when the patient lies down for consultation
and when the doctor gets close to them, which is the trigger for starting the
patient examination.
The smart node placed within each room will receive RFID information using
two antennas. One of them is placed at the door frame and the other at the
water sink. Both antennas have different size and gain, which leads to different
distance detection ranges. The antenna placed at the door frame aims to detect
all badges worn inside the room by patients, practitioners or other identifiable
persons. This antenna must be placed opposite to the corridor in order to avoid
false positives. On the other hand, the antenna placed near the sink will have a
detection range up to 80 centimeters. This is because this antenna must detect
only the badge associated to the person using the sink.
In addition to the smart node, the sensor network in the GP office includes
four dummy nodes in charge of triggering low-level events denoting that equip-
ment is being used. These include the soap dispenser, disinfectant gel, disposable
gloves and the trash can. All these devices have been modified to electronically
detect use and transmit the event to the smart node. Figure 3 shows the sen-
sor node with BLE connectivity and its location within the trash can and glove
dispenser.
Installation of the sensor network in the minor surgery room is similar to the
GP office, except that the minor surgery ward involves two rooms, the consulta-
tion room and the operating room. As both include an area for hand hygiene and
consultation bed, we find that most devices must be duplicated. RFID readers
must be installed at both door rooms and both water sinks. It’s also necessary
to detect the same triggered events as in the GP office: use of soap dispenser or
antimicrobial gel, use of the glove dispenser and trash can. However, there are
also some important differences between the surgery room and the GP office.
First, there must be a way to ensure that the doctor is going to use disinfected
equipment before surgery. After the autoclave sterilization procedure is com-
Fig. 3. Dummy nodes located in trash can and gloves dispenser.
pleted, a barcode sticker is attached to every bag where items are packaged.
When the nurse is preparing the equipment, all the items to be used are iden-
tified through a barcode reader placed on the wall near the equipment cabinet.
Second, surgery lamps prevent thermal array sensors in the ceiling from detecting
when the patient is laying down on the operating table. This event is triggered
using a combination of infrared sensors and RFID signal quality levels. Finally,
the system must detect when the operating table is cleaned after each procedure.
For this, a smart holder for the disinfectant spray has been built to detect, using
a simple electronic switch, when the spray is used.
4.1 Communication Infrastructure
In June 2010, the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) published the 4.0
version, which introduced a new specification, known as Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) [6]. This allows devices that do not require transmitting large volumes
of data to connect to each other and communicate while consuming a minimum
amount of energy.
This HAI-OPS platform is developed around this technology. Dummy nodes
include a BLE112 Smart Module from Bluegiga [44], which integrates features
required for BLE applications including radio, software stack and GATT-based
profiles. Moreover, it has flexible hardware interfaces to connect different pe-
ripherals and sensors and it is powered directly from a standard 3V coin cell
battery.
The network architecture used in the HAI-OPS platform is a star topology,
which in its simplest form consists of a central device that can connect to multiple
peripherals. The Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) establishes how to exchange
data over BLE. It makes use of the Attribute protocol (ATT) which is used to
store services, characteristics and related data in a table. Most of the ATT proto-
col is pure client-server: the client takes the initiative, while the server responds.
But it also has notifications and indication capabilities, in which the server takes
the initiative of notifying a client that an attribute value has changed. The low-
est concept in GATT communications is the characteristic, which encapsulates
single data, such as sensor measurements.
All data generated by dummy nodes is collected by a smart node and sent
to a database server. Smart nodes generate more data than dummy nodes and
therefore require a more powerful communication interface. First of all, the smart
node must have full time connectivity to the central server and must always be
available for receiving events from dummy nodes. Second, data sent by smart
nodes has to reach a web server which may be located inside or outside the local
area network. In both cases, smart devices have to reach a router or an access
point which is most likely located in another room, separated by several walls.
Finally, data generated by some sensors like the RFID or the passive-infrared
array require a transmission rate of several Mbits/s.
The smart node integrates an Ethernet connector which allows it to connect
to the local network deployed in the building. In situations when cable instal-
lation is not possible in certain locations, the smart device may use its 802.11n
wireless module.
Data exchanged between smart nodes and the database server is formatted
in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format [19]. JSON is text, so it is easy
to work with the data as objects, with no complicated paring and translations.
Moreover, when storing data, the data has to be a certain format, and text is
always one of the legal formats.
5 Software Components
The HAI-OPS cyber-physical platform’s software architecture employs a client-
server model, with a server installed for each clinical unit, to which multiple
heterogeneous clients can connect. Considering this aspect, the present section
discusses the essential components of the platform’s server side, followed by the
expected components that make up the client.
Being a cyber-physical platform, the hardware devices required to measure
and record activities and their associated software are of major importance. Each
such device contains the required networking hardware and software controller
that allow it to connect to the HAI-OPS server in order to transmit live data.
We refer the reader to Section 4 for more details about the hardware side of
these devices. The software applications that manage the hardware equipment
vary, according to device type: for dummy nodes, we used the ”BLE SW Update
Tool” [44], while smart nodes’ software was created using the Python program-
ming language, including support from specialized libraries for operations such
as access to system Bluetooth and BLE resources, reading and writing of digital
pins, communication with the RFID sensor, Inter-Integrated Circuit communi-
cation [35] or analog to digital conversion.
5.1 Server Modules
Providing real-time alerts in case of detected infection risk is the leading feature
of the server software. However, to achieve this, the system first needs to be able
to receive data from connected devices and hospital information systems (when
available), to process and analyze the data and to monitor the infection risk
using workflow technology. In addition, the server-side software will also perform
analyses on collected data, which must thus be persisted. As a consequence of all
these, the server main components, which are detailed below, are grouped into
four major categories: data acquisition, workflow engine, data store and client
facing subsystems.
Data Acquisition. This component’s main goal is to send the data recorded by
the platform’s connected devices to the system’s data store persistent repository.
A REST architecture [24] is implemented by the server to receive sensor data
and the incoming readings are JSON formatted [19]. All measurements trans-
mitted to the server by the sensors have at least the following essential fields: a
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and a sensor unique identifier for identification
of the reading, its source node and the time stamp. In addition to these, each
measurement might contain further attributes according to its type: presence
sensors might send boolean values, RFID readers will send the identification tag
detected and so on.
As a secondary purpose, the data acquisition component can interact with
hospital information systems. Such systems contain a wealth of information that
can be used for prevention of infections and outbreaks, such as patient suscepti-
bility data, arrangement and location of patients and patient beds, information
about patients that are immunosuppressed or otherwise at a greater risk for con-
tracting infections. Data received from these external systems is stored in the
data repository, from where it is expected to be reused for further analyses.
Workflow Engine. A modelling component allows creating, deleting and up-
dating workflows monitored by the system. These workflows can be executed by
any commercial off the shelf workflow engine implementation that understands
BPMN notation. The workflow engine interprets events, such as inputs from
deployed sensors and acts upon them according to a predefined process, repre-
sented by the modelled workflow. The workflow engine component also integrates
a generic adapter interface that can be developed to have various implementa-
tions, to abstract the particularities of the specific workflow engine employed. As
such, HAI-OPS can be used with any major workflow engine implementation,
as long as a suitable workflow adapter component is implemented. Monitored
workflows can be managed via a user interface, as detailed within section 5.2 by
the system’s administrator and they are persisted in the data store.
Data Store. This component is the systems data repository, being responsible
with data persistence for registered users and devices, workflow instances and
workflow metadata, as well as raw data recorded from the network of connected
devices or any input transmitted by deployed hospital information systems. All
stored data will be used for complex analyses part of the system’s advanced
line of defence geared towards pinpointing elusive reasons of infection and for
monitoring outbreaks. The data store is implemented using Couchbase Server
[14].
Client Facing Subsystems. This component includes those subsystems which
are connected to client components detailed in section 5.2, offering server-side
functionality for real-time alerting, data analysis and user and device manage-
ment.
Real-Time Alerting. This is a key component of the system, as it is directly
responsible with creating and transmitting the alerts. Whenever an instantiated
workflow reaches a point where an infection risk is detected, the workflow engine
adapter component will send the required data to this subsystem, which will
create an alert and send it to responsible end-users. All alerts contain at least
the following information: the workflow, device and person responsible as well
as date and time information together with a textual description. The alert data
is sent to the user through the alerter client component installed on the users’
smartphone. In case of alert, the involved person will have to take corrective
measures. All generated alerts are persisted in the data store.
Data Analysis. This component provides the advanced data analysis capabili-
ties of the platform. Using data received from the connected devices and existing
hospital information systems, its purpose is to aggregate context information and
sensor readings and provide information regarding outbreak and infection risk,
as well as to facilitate the identification of infection sources and means of trans-
mission in the case of outbreak. It is directly connected to the client epidemiology
user interface detailed in section 5.2, which allows epidemiologists to visualize
analyses results.
User and Device Management. All information regarding users and devices
is deposited within the data store repository, thus being made available to other
system components. Both entity types need to be uniquely identifiable, as work-
flow execution and alert transmission is tightly linked with involved users and
connected devices registered within the system. System users can have one of
the administrator, epidemiologist or clinical personnel roles with a role-based
access permission system put into place.
5.2 Client Components
Two client applications are included in the HAI-OPS platform: the Alerter Client
mobile application used to transmit alerts to clinical personnel using their smart-
phones or other smart wearables, and the Administration Client web application
that provides the required features to enable management of connected devices,
users and workflows.
Alerter Client. Users registered within the system will have the Alerter Client
application installed on their smartphone. The application will provide two fea-
tures: (1) Receive push notification when an alert is generated for the involved
person; (2) View history of past alerts for the involved person. The received
message will contain detailed information regarding why the alert was generated
as well as a meaningful description. As further development, we will also ana-
lyze the possibility of using alternate means of notification, such as using short
text messages (SMS) that will be received by the registered users mobile de-
vice, which would allow personnel to receive alerts without installing additional
software. While the current platform of choice is the smartphone, the system
can work with any programmable device, such as smart wearables or a custom
design active badge based on RFID technology.
Administration Client. User, workflow and smart device administration will
be achieved using a web application locally installed at each medical unit where
the HAI-OPS platform is deployed. The administration client will provide user
interfaces for:
– Visualizing the complete history and details for the alerts that were gener-
ated for a specific user. Users having administrator privileges will be able to
view the entire alert history for any registered user.
– Managing HAI related data. This interface is targeted towards epidemiolo-
gists and will allow them to visualize the results of various statistical anal-
yses applied on collected data (e.g. statistics based on historical alert data,
aggregated by user, workflow or by sensor). This information will allow iden-
tification of infection and outbreak hotspots, as well as of locations where
additional disinfection procedures or staff are needed. This interface will
also have access to more complex reports, including risk maps and contact
networks which, in conjunction with historical alert data, are important in-
struments for the identification of transmission pathways.
– Administration of connected devices, registered users and monitored work-
flows. The associated user interface will only be available to users registered
as administrators. They are responsible with managing system users and
employed smart devices. When the system is deployed in a clinical unit, the
administrator will manage the monitored workflows, and will modify them
as required, maintaining a continuous communication with the clinical per-
sonnel.
Conclusions
Seven to ten people out of every 100 hospitalized patients worldwide acquire
at least one hospital infection [60]. The risk of contacting or transmitting a
hospital acquired infection can be greatly reduced, provided that medical units
are equipped with efficient tools that ensure compliance to sanitation regulations
and that medical personnel pay particular attention to hygiene.
Through our research within the HAI-OPS project [28] and through the
platform under development, we are aiming to bring a contribution towards
decreasing infection-related morbidity and mortality, to help prevent outbreaks
and also have an indirect positive impact regarding other connected issues, such
as the war against antimicrobial resistant pathogens.
The HAI-OPS platform is still under development and the present paper
depicts this system in its current stage, emphasizing both hardware and soft-
ware components. Using a wireless network of smart devices and sensors to
monitor clinical processes that might be involved in infection transmission, the
system detects potential risks in real-time and immediately alerts involved per-
sons. Two clinical processes of different complexity, which were included in the
system’s prototype, as they were selected for implementation during the first
pilot deployment, are detailed in this paper for exemplification: general prac-
titioner examination and minor surgery. Similarly to all clinical processes that
will be included in the system, according to medical activities that take place
at various deployment locations, these processes are BPMN encoded and are
executed by a workflow engine. In case of a process violation, which is detected
via the wireless sensor network, the engine communicates this to the real-time
alerting subsystem, which promptly sends notifications to responsible medical
personnel. Thus, any clinical process can only be completely and successfully
executed when preventive guidelines are followed.
Current achievements constitute the basic line of defense which our system
offers for protection against infections. As further development, we intend to add
an advanced line of defence, which will bring the platform to its maturity. This
will include advanced analysis tools and algorithms to process data collected by
sensors during large periods of time. Together with information extracted from
hospital systems, risk maps will be constructed to depict the degree of infectious
risk at room level. Contact networks will be used to analyze the source and
spread of infection. These will be presented in an easy to understand, visual
form and will assist epidemiologists in pinpointing elusive reasons of infection,
in monitoring outbreaks and, most importantly, in planning infection prevention
and control.
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